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Family law proceedings and intra UK jurisdiction 
 
 
 
The rules of jurisdiction in various types of family law proceedings are contained in 
the so--called Brussels II bis Regulation (Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003) 
which came into force on 1 March 2005, replacing an earlier and less extensive 
instrument which itself came into force on 1 March 2001.  As a form of legislation 
under EU law the Regulation clearly applies in situations where jurisdiction in family 
actions is to be allocated between two or more EU states (but not including 
Denmark).   But there is a view that the Regulation has a wider scope and that it also 
applies to conflicts of jurisdiction between the courts in the different legal systems 
within the United Kingdom.  It is perhaps surprising that anyone should ever have 
thought that this is the case, as it is generally accepted that EU regulations and 
conventions on jurisdiction (eg the Brussels Convention 1968, the Brussels I 
Regulation (Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001), the EU Insolvency Regulation 
(Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000)) do not by themselves alter the law of 
jurisdiction in a member state in cases which are purely internal to that state.  In 
other words, one would expect that there would be something in the Brussels II bis 
Regulation itself which makes it abundantly clear that it applies to cases within one 
member state which involve no contact with any other state.  
 
Nevertheless, there is a Scottish decision which is premised on the basis that the 
Regulation allocates jurisdiction between the UK legal systems in cases of this type.  
This is S v D 2007 SLT (Sh Ct) 37.  Unfortunately, the decision in that case gives no 
reason for adopting the position on the scope of the Regulation, which is rather 
treated as self-evidently true.  Yet there are formidable difficulties in finding any basis 
for this approach. I have described these in some detail in a previous paper (see 
2007 SLT (News) 117) and there is no need to repeat those arguments here.  
However, there is one supposed basis for accepting an extensive scope for the 
Regulation which is worth noting, for at first glance it looks like a solid, almost 
decisive, consideration but which on reflection has next to no bearing on the issue. 
 
This point focuses on article 66 of the Regulation, which is headed 'Member States 
with two or more legal systems'.  Article 66 provides rules in respect of such legal 
systems "concerning matters governed by this Regulation" to the effect that where 
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the Regulation refers, for example, to connecting factors such as habitual residence 
or domicile in a Member State then for states with more than one legal system the 
reference is to be taken as meaning the connecting factor in question in the particular 
territorial unit of the State.  And so, the argument runs, as the Regulation contains 
provisions about allocating jurisdiction between courts in different legal systems 
within a State, it follows that the Regulation must apply whenever there is an issue of 
competing jurisdiction within that State. 
 
But simply as a matter of logic this conclusion does not follow.  In its own terms 
Article 66 comes into play when a case is governed by the Regulation but it does not 
in itself say what those cases are.  Rather, this provision uses a different method for 
achieving what other EU regulations also do, namely allocating jurisdiction not to the 
courts in a Member State but to the courts for a particular place within a Member 
State (including states which, like the UK, have more than one legal system).  Article 
66 is modelled on similar provisions in various Hague Conventions (such as the 1996 
Convention on Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children), 
but it has never been suggested that these conventions apply to intra UK conflicts of 
jurisdiction, far less that  they do so because of provisions like article 66 of Brussels II 
bis. 
 
Moreover, since S v D there have been a number of cases which support the view 
that the decision in that case is wrong and that the Regulation does not apply in 
purely intra-UK cases. Two of these cases are from Northern Ireland.  The first, Re C 
and C [2005] NI Fam 3 is not the strongest of authorities as the issue of the scope of 
the Regulation was a matter of concession by counsel.   
 
A more direct case is that of Re ESJ A Minor [2008] NI Fam 6, for here the judge 
(Morgan J) was presented with opposing submissions on whether the Regulation 
applied where the courts in either Wales or Northern Ireland (or both) had jurisdiction 
over an issue of parental responsibility. His Lordship held that the Regulation had no 
application in a conflict of jurisdiction which was purely between the courts of 
different systems within the UK.  His method was to look for some indicator which 
pointed to the application of the Regulation in such disputes but he could find none. 
He considered article 61(c) of the Treaty (from which the validity of the Regulation is 
derived), recital 13 to the Regulation, as well as articles 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 10, and 15 of 
the Regulation.  His conclusion (para 11) was that: "All of these provisions and in 
particular the transfer provisions [in article 15] strongly suggest that the Regulation is 
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concerned with jurisdictional disputes between Member States rather than the 
determination of the particular court within a member State having responsibility for 
the matter at issue." 
 
Morgan J also paid particular attention to article 66 of the Regulation but reached the 
commonsense conclusion that for that provision to be engaged it was first necessary 
to identify the scope of the Regulation itself. 
 
His Lordship also made some comment about the amendments to the Family Law 
Act 1986 which were made following the coming into force of the Regulation.  The 
provisions of the 1986 Act for England and Wales and for Northern Ireland are 
broadly similar.  (The amendments for Scots law are different.)  This point is 
significant for it has been argued from the perspective of English law that the 
amended version of the 1986 Act only makes sense on the basis that Regulation 
applies to intra UK matters.  (See K Beevers and D McClean, [2005] International 
Family Law 129.)  Although this is not something on which a Scots lawyer can safely 
comment, it is worth noting that Morgan J was able to construe the provisions of the 
1986 Act for Northern Ireland without arriving at that conclusion. 
 
Finally, there is a more recent sheriff court decision which reaches the opposite 
conclusion from that in S v D.  In MB v CB (Dunfermline Sheriff Court, 18 August 
2008), there was a potential conflict of jurisdiction between courts in Scotland and 
England in a matter of parental responsibility.  After hearing submissions on the 
point, the sheriff repelled the defender's plea in law that the case was governed by 
the Brussels II bis Regulation and therefore the sheriff court at Dunfermline lacked 
jurisdiction.  The sheriff adopted an approach similar to that of Morgan J in Re ESJ A 
Minor (though that decision does not appear to have been cited to him).  He held that 
article 66 of the Regulation could not be read as having the effect of making the 
Regulation applicable to intra UK matters.  Provision dealing with the scope of the 
Regulation had to be found elsewhere.  However, for the sheriff there was nothing in 
the Regulation itself or in the amendments made to Scots law in consequence of the 
Regulation which provided support for the defender's plea. 
 
It is to be hoped that these decisions will remove any confusion following on from the 
decision in S v D.  Until such time as the House of Lords make a reference for a 
preliminary ruling on the point and the European Court of Justice says otherwise, it 
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should be taken as settled that the Brussels II bis Regulation does not apply to 
disputes of jurisdiction which involve only the courts in different parts of the UK.   
 
Professor Gerry Maher QC 
University of Edinburgh 
